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C ontem porary  philosophical aesthetics, as well as philosophy in  gen­
eral, is characterized  by a loss o f  faith in various objectivist an d  foundation- 
alist ideals. Having increasingly freed  itself from  its trad itional aim  to find 
foundations, essences, an d  necessities, philosophy has becom e «nči-founda- 
tionalist, cha lleng ing  the trad itional co n cep tio n  th a t ph ilosophy  shou ld  
provide im m utable grounds for hum an knowledge and  practices. Anti-foun- 
dationalism  says th a t such g rounds are n e ith e r available n o r req u ired  (see 
Shusterm an 1997b, 157). T h ere  are, however, d ifferen t op in ions as to w hat 
form  such anti-foundationalism  should take. My aim is to take a look at som e 
ways to u n d erstan d  anti-foundationalism  within aesthetics, an d  a focus for 
my presentation is given by the recen t work o f R ichard Shusterm an, who has, 
in a n u m b er o f papers and  books, discussed these issues as a p a rt o f  his ef­
forts to construe a neo-pragm atist aesthetics.
Interpretation
Perhaps the m ost influential version o f anti-foundationalism  is associ­
ated  with som eth ing  tha t could  be called the »interpretive turn« in con tem ­
porary  ph ilo sophy  (see Hiley, B ohm an & S husterm an  1991). Especially 
w ithin recen t Anglo-Am erican philosophy this tu rn  to in te rp re ta tio n  and  
herm eneu tics has been  welcom ed as an  an tido te  to various form s o f em piri­
cism, an d  it is characteristic o f d ifferen t versions o f »post-analytic« philoso­
phy. This way o f u n d erstan d in g  the lessons o f  anti-foundationalism  is to say 
th a t in te rp re ta tio n  »goes all the way«; th e re  are no  »bru te facts« o r any 
im m ediate access to  reality. Everything we understand  is, the a rg u m en t goes, 
in one  way o r an o th e r m ediated  th rough  o u r in terp re ta tions o r »cognitive 
schemes«. Consequently, the idea is tha t we do n o t only in te rp re t th ings o r 
texts that are som ehow  obscure o r am biguous, bu t th a t » in terp re ta tion  be­
gins at hom e« (to use D onald D avidson’s phrase). This am ounts to claim ­
ing tha t all in telligen t behaviour, even o u r relation to ou r native tongue and  
thus to the world is based on in terp re ta tion .
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Shusterm an has characterised such a view as hermeneutic universalism and  
defines it as follows: it is the view that »simply to perceive, read, u n derstand , 
o r  behave intelligently  at all is already, and  m ust always be, to in terp re t«  
(Shusterm an 1991, 102).
This kind o f universalism builds upon  the idea o f the herm eneutic circle 
in  its m ost general sense: all understand ing  is in te rp re ta tion , and  every new 
in terp re tation  always presupposes an already in terp re ted  starting point. Thus 
we have no  recourse to an  »un in terp re ted  reality« outside the circle, and  
o u r horizon  o r perspective always already limits o u r u n d ers tan d in g .1 W hat 
we should  insist on  is the »universality o f the h erm en eu tic  problem «.
T he central a rg u m en t for »herm eneutic universalism« goes as follows:
1) all u n d ers tan d in g  is linguistic and
2) all linguistic u n d erstan d in g  entails in te rp re ta tio n  o r »decoding« o f 
signs (see Shusterm an 1991, 115).
In terp re ta tio n , in short, is seen as som e k ind  o f explanation  o f how we 
can u n d ers tan d  language (and  thereby o th e r people, art, etc.). T he m ajor 
p rob lem  with this kind o f view is that the use o f such an expansive n o tio n  
o f in te rp re ta tio n  e ither
a) m akes » in terpretation«  an em pty catch-all w ord (by m aking it im ­
possible to con trast u n d e rs tan d in g  and  in te rp re ta tio n ), or
b) over-intellectualises our understand ing  o f language as well as o f  art 
by m odelling it on  the in terpre tation  o f difficult texts with h idden  m eanings.
As Shusterm an (1991, 113) points out, such h erm eneu tic  universalism  
is a version o f w h a tjo h n  Dewey called »intellectualism «, and  which he  con­
sidered  a m ajor problem  o f W estern philosophy. In  his p ap er »B eneath In ­
te rp reta tion«  (1991) Shusterm an shows how som e o f the m ain argum ents 
fo r such universalism  can be confronted . He m aintains tha t in te rp re ta tio n  
is characteristically linguistic, w hereas u n d erstan d in g  is often  tacit: »while 
understand ing  is frequently a m atter of [...] unproblem atic handling  o f w hat 
we encounter, in terp re ta tion  characteristically involves a p roblem  situation« 
(Shusterm an 1991,126). H ere Shusterm an is partly drawing on  W ittgenstein, 
who insists on the intrinsic problem -solving charac ter o f in te rp re ta tio n  by 
con trasting  it to im m ediate understanding .
1 A m ajor C ontinental background influence here is o f course Nietzsche, whose 
perspectivism and idea of there being »no facts, only interpretations« is frequently 
cited in support o f different forms of herm eneutic universalism (cf. Shusterman 1991, 
103). O n the analytic side, the influence of Q uine’s idea of radical translation is 
difficult to overestimate. This odd couple should make us realise that there are 
enorm ous differences am ong the philosophical views Shusterm an subsumes un d er 
the title o f herm eneutic  universalism; there are, however, also in teresting  and  
surprising similarities between them.
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W hat Shusterm an (1991, 104) argues is tha t » in terp re tation  is b e tte r 
served by letting it leave room  for som ething else (beneath o r before it) «. W hat 
then, is this »something« beneath  o r before in terpretation? Shusterm an sug­
gests that it can be characterised as o u r somatic experience. But he  also uses 
the term  »reaction« to characterise a way o f understand ing  tha t is n o t an in­
terpretation .2
Experience
Shusterm an wants to co u n te r the claims o f h e rm en eu tic  universalism  
by developing a pragm atist anti-foundationalism : he wants to em phasize the 
ro le  o f  sp o n tan eo u s reactions an d  instinctive behav iou r as indicative o f 
understand ing , and  to contrast this with in terp re tation . So far I am in agree­
m en t with Shusterm an: however, I th ink  he gets in to  serious problem s w hen 
he goes on to equate this idea o f reaction and  im m ediate understand ing  with 
th a t o f an experience.
S huste rm an  wishes to m ake a case for »prereflective, non lin g u istic  
experience an d  understanding«  (Shusterm an 1991, 119). This k ind  o f ex­
perience, Shusterm an thinks, is best them atized in classical pragm atism , and  
especially in Dewey’s philosophy. S husterm an starts his apology fo r Dewey 
in Pragmatist Aesthetics (1992), and  has co n tin u ed  this rehab ilita tion  in his 
m ost recen t publications, a p ap er called (ironically) »The E nd  o f A esthetic 
Experience« (Shusterm an 1997a) an d  his new book  Practicing Philosophy: 
Pragmatism and the Philosophical Life (Shusterm an 1997b).
D ew ey’s ph ilo so p h y , S h u s te rm an  (1997b, 171) th in k s , ex p resses  
»pragm atism ’s traditional concern with the somatic and  non-discursive«, and  
it is this trad ition  tha t he wants to rehabilitate . C on tinu ing  on  the  lines o f 
Dewey, S husterm an insists that w hat is b en eath  o r before in te rp re ta tio n  is, 
in the last instance, o u r som atic existence, w hat Dewey calls »anim al life 
below the h u m an  scale«, o r the »live creature« tha t interacts with the  world. 
This in teraction , bo th  Dewey and  Shusterm an think, is best characterised  
as »experience«.
In Dewey’s spirit Shusterm an claims th a t the involvem ent o f  the em ­
bodied  subject with the world is at its clearest w hen art and the aesthetic are 
concerned . Thus it is precisely in term s o f the aesthetic and  the  som atic that
2 An in terpretation, Shusterm an (1991, 127) says, characteristically expresses itself in 
a linguistic form; »understanding, on the o ther hand, does not require linguistic 




the  n o tion  o f experience should  be articu la ted  (Shusterm an 1997b, 161). 
This is because »the aesthetic is cen tral to the realm  o f experienced  value« 
as Shusterm an (1997b, 166) puts it.
This, Shusterm an thinks, is som eth ing  th a t especially analytic aesthe t­
ics has missed, since it has concen tra ted  alm ost entirely  on questions o f  se­
m antics an d  dem arcation  (i.e., the m eaning  an d  »languages« o f art an d  the 
d efin itio n  o f art) . In  m ost analytical aesthetics, S husterm an  (1997a, 38) 
claims, »felt experience is virtually ignored  an d  en tirely  su b o rd in a ted  to 
th ird-person  sem antic theories o f  artistic sym bolization and  its in te rp re ta ­
tion.«
Shusterm an, instead, wants to argue for w hat he  calls the »phenom eno­
logical« and  »evaluative« dim ensions o f aesthetic experience and  to connect 
them  to an  em phasis on  the som atic, non-conceptual dim ensions o f non- 
in terp re ta tive  understand ing . Thus, it is the subjectively felt, »satisfyingly 
h e ig h ten ed , absorbing, m eaningful and  affective experience« (1997a, 38) 
th a t is im p o rtan t an d  th a t we should  em phasize instead o f the physical ob­
jec ts  o f th a t experience, S husterm an says. This, o f  course, echoes Dewey’s 
Art as Experience.
I am  m ainly sym pathetic with S husterm an’s aims, bu t skeptical o f  his 
a ttem pts to rehab ilita te  the n o tion  o f an  »experience«. I th ink  th a t by us­
ing  this term  he ju s t takes over Dewey’s philosophical problem s. As we know, 
it is precisely Dewey’s appeal to »experience« tha t has been  considered p rob ­
lem atic, even am ong ph ilosophers sym pathetic to his project. For instance 
R ichard Rortysays that Dewey should have »dropped the term  ‘ex perience’« 
instead  o f  m aking it the cen tre  o f  his philosophy (Rorty 1994, 60; cited  in 
Shusterm an 1997b, 158). Rorty (correctly, I think) considers Dewey’s appeal 
to  ex p erien ce  a k ind  o f  foundationalism : Dewey claims for exam ple th a t 
im m ediate  experience is the »underlying quality« w hich is the regulative 
principle in all thinking (see Shusterm an 1997b, 165). Shusterm an acknowl­
edges these traits o f foundationalism  in Dewey, b u t he  thinks tha t h e  can 
show  how  to d isen tan g le  the  idea  o f ex p e rien ce  from  foundationalism . 
U nfortunately I do no t think he is successful in this attem pt, and  while I agree 
w ith S h u ste rm an ’s criticism  o f h erm en eu tic  universalism  (as a species o f 
intellectualism ) I do  also agree with Rorty an d  o thers who th ink  th a t the 
n o tio n  o f  »experience« is hopelessly confused.
Especially in his new est book  Shusterm an goes too far in his u rg e  to 
com bat the intellectualism  o f  traditional philosophy. S husterm an says tha t 
we shou ld  give u p  the resistance to »non-discursive soma« an d  them atize, 
in philosophy, this somatic dim ension of our being-in-the-world. So far, I have 
n o  a rg u m en t with him . I also th ink he m ight have a p o in t w hen he says th a t
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philosophy can and  should  becom e »transform ational instead o f  founda­
tional«, th a t is, a k in d  o f »cultural criticism  th a t aims to reco n stru c t o u r 
practices an d  institutions so as to im prove the experienced  quality o f  o u r 
lives« (Shusterm an 1997b, 157). However, Shusterm an th en  goes on  to iden­
tify this »experienced  quality« with som atic experience, which can be im ­
p roved  by d iffe ren t »bodily practices« (he m en tio n s, fo r ex am p le , th e  
A lexander technique, bodybuilding, aerobics, etc.). These bodily practices, 
he  claims, aim  a t »a b e tte r harm ony o f lived experience«. S husterm an  even 
wants to »integrate such bodily disciplines in to  the very practice o f  philoso­
phy« m aking philosophy »a discipline o f em bod ied  life« as he  puts it (ibid., 
176). T hus h e  concludes that »im proved experience, no t orig inary  tru th , is 
the u ltim ate philosophical goal and  criterion« (ibid., 157). Shusterm an fur­
th e r  th inks th a t  such  bodily, im m ed ia te  ex p e rien ce  is b est a r tic u la te d  
through  the aesthetic. He has even figured o u t a nam e for this newly somatic, 
aesthetic ph ilosophical practice: he calls it somaesthetics.
W hile I can appreciate  S hu ste rm an ’s m issionary zeal and  reg ard  his 
w riting as a k ind  o f m anifesto (which explains the rhetorical exaggeration) 
I do  n o t th ink  he is philosophically convincing. Ironically en o u g h  he is very 
persuasive w hen criticizing the vestiges o f foundationalism  in Dewey, b u t 
w hen it com es to developing an alternative he offers his »som aesthetics« 
m ore o f less w ithout argum ent. Indeed , as we shall presently  see, w hen he 
attem pts to philosophically  e labo rate  the  n o tio n  o f »experience«  he be­
com es deeply enm eshed  in the kind o f dualisms he attem pts to free philoso­
phy from , an d  is driven dangerously close to som ething tha t could  be called 
»som atic fo u n d a tio n a lism « . T h a t is, he  is n o t c o n te n t w ith w an tin g  to 
them atize the bodily d im ension o f o u r life, b u t wants to m ake it the  prim e 
focus bo th  o f philosophy and  o f life. However, here  he m akes a m istake: a 
criticism  o f intellectualism  does n o t m ean  tha t we should  have to em brace 
its d ia m e tr ic  o p p o s ite  a n d  a sse rt th e  p rim acy  o f  th e  som a. A ctually , 
Shusterm an m akes the same kind o f m istake as the h erm eneu tic  universal- 
ists, only the o th e r way around.
Shusterm an, by appealing  to the aesthetic experience , tries to assert 
som ething that R ichard W ollheim has called »the suprem acy o f life over art«. 
T h ere  is n o th in g  intrinsically w rong with this view, b u t as W ollheim  notes, 
the prob lem  with is to »understand  ... the idea in such a way as to fall nei­
th e r in to  triviality o r error«  (W ollheim 1980, 99-100). However, I th ink  that 
som e o f  S h u ste rm an ’s views are both  trivial and  erroneous; the m ain  rea ­
son fo r this is the  way h e  drives a wedge betw een the in tellect and  th e  soma, 
in a very classical dualist m anner, in spite o f his lip-service to the opposite.
155
Simo Säätelä
Shusterm an is righ t w hen saying that we should  realise the im portance 
o f  the  non-discursive and  som atic d im ension o f  o u r in terac tio n  with the 
w orld, an d  th a t it is especially im p o rtan t when we are co n cern ed  with the 
philosophy o f a rt an d  aesthetics. Nevertheless, I do  n o t th ink  we have to 
follow Shusterm an’s somatic tu rn  and equate the u n in terp re ted  with som atic 
experience. T he reason for this is that there is a philosophically viable m iddle 
ro ad  betw een h erm eneu tic  universalism and  som atic foundationalism , be­
tween intellectualism  and  »somaesthetics«, and  this is, perhaps n o t very sur­
prisingly, to be found  in the later philosophy o f W ittgenstein.
L et m e, in the tim e th a t rem ains, briefly ou tline som e m ain  poin ts o f 
such an alternative. W ittgenstein is, as we already m entioned, an a rd en t critic 
o f  the  k ind  o f intellectualism  th a t is m anifested as h erm en eu tic  universal­
ism. But I th ink  h e  can also give an  alternative to Dewey’s and  S h u ste rm an ’s 
pragm atist philosophy o f experience. In this context, this alternative can best 
be sketched  o u t by e laborating  the term  »reaction«.
Reaction
How then , is this alternative to be understood?
L et us first look at W ittgenstein’s relation  to the claims o f h e rm e n eu ­
tic universalism . It is clear tha t W ittgenstein is opposed  to the idea th a t u n ­
derstand ing  always is, o r requires, in terp re tation . Establishing a con trast be­
tw een im m ediate  u n d ers tan d in g  and  in te rp re ta tio n  is very im p o rtan t for 
W ittgenstein, since it is cen tral for instance to w hat he says abou t the con ­
cep t o f »following a rule«; there  certainly is such a th ing  as a way o f acting 
th a t is g ro u n d ed  in in te rp re ta tio n , b u t n o t all rule-following can be u n d e r­
stood  in such a way -  instead, there  m ust be cases w here we follow the ru le  
unhesitantly, w ithout any in terpre tation  (see, e.g., W ittgenstein 1958, § 201).
W ittgenstein thus opposes w hat could  be called the m ythology o f in­
terp reta tion : the view tha t linguistic und erstan d in g  m ust always be a m atte r 
o f  deco d in g  o r in terp re ting . W ittgenstein’s way o f coun tering  this m ythol­
ogy is to  say th a t lan g u ag e  c a n n o t be based  on  th in k in g . R ather, it is 
g ro u n d ed  in o u r form s o f life, in o u r instinctive behaviour and  na tu ra l re ­
actions -  th a t is, o u r em bodied  existence as a certain  k ind  o f creature . He 
says th a t we do  »naturally« u n d ers tan d  certain  rules ju s t by being given ex­
am ples, ju s t as we naturally understand  a po in ting  gesture; »and understand ­
ing h ere  m eans reacting« (W ittgenstein 1969a, 141). N o act o f inner, labo­
rious in te rp re ta tio n  is involved.
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W hat is even m ore interesting from  our point o f view is th a t W ittgenstein 
also makes a similar po in t in his lectures on aesthetics, w here he says: »Per­
haps the m ost im portan t thing in connection  with aesthetics is what may be 
called aesthetic reactions« (W ittgenstein 1966, 13). T here  w ould be m uch 
to say abou t the idea o f aesthetic reactions (see fu rther Säätelä 1995 8c Säätelä 
1998, ch. 3), b u t w hat I w ant to em phasize h ere  is th a t W ittgenstein’s use o f 
this no tion  m ust be seen as a way po in ting  o u t that o u r prim ary re la tion  to 
a rt an d  o th e r aesthetic p h en o m en a  can n o t be an  in terp retative one. How­
ever, this does n o t m ean  that W ittgenstein is ignoring  the ro le  o f reason  and  
th ink ing  in the arts o r  in ou r lives.
Even though  critical o f  herm en eu tic  universalism , W ittgenstein  is to 
large ex ten t in accord  with the central insights o f h e rm en eu tic  philosophy, 
fo r instance when insisting on  the im portance o f  a con tex t o r  horizon  for 
o u r u n d ers tan d in g  of, for instance, a sen tence o r sign. In fact, W ittgenstein 
also claims tha t art and  artistic appreciation, in a very similar way as language, 
can only be m ade sense o f by placing it in  the cu ltural co n tex t to w hich it 
belongs and  which shapes it.
However, W ittgenstein does n o t accep t the idea o f endless in te rp re ta ­
tion, im plicit in the idea o f the herm eneu tic  circle. Instead, the  con tex t p re­
requisite for u n d erstan d in g  is given to us byways o f  behaving an d  reacting, 
an d  ultim ately by a form  o f life. This m eans tha t no  object can be properly  
u n d ers to o d  if we can n o t in one way o r an o th e r partic ipate in the com pli­
cated  set o f activities o r practices to which it belongs. In this sense practice, 
o r ways o f reacting  an d  acting, give us the horizon  within which an  object 
becom es m eaningful. This is w hat has been  called W ittgenstein’s »one-step 
herm eneutics« .3 Instead o f a circularity o f in terp re ta tion , we have a circu­
larity between understand ing  and  doing, that is, participating in the relevant 
practices. Thus the »oscillations o f herm eneutical theory are short-circuited« 
(A ckerm ann 1988, 18) w hen we reach a way o f grasping tha t is n o t an  in ter­
p re ta tion , that is, w hen we have reached  action  o r reaction. In  the  case o f 
aesthetics and  apprecia tion  o f art, this s topping  p o in t can be called an  aes­
thetic reaction. W hen we, in a particu lar case, have reached  aesthetic  reac­
tions, the question o f in te rp re ta tio n  does n o t arise any m ore.
W hen it com es to aesthetics an d  a r t this d em an d  fo r p a rtic ip a tio n  
m eans a d em an d  tha t we subm it ourselves to the object an d  react to w hat 
we perceive. This d em an d  for an  im m ediate reaction  also m eans th a t the
3 This term  is introduced by Robert Ackerm ann, who maintains tha t »W ittgenstein’s 
key to ph ilosoph ica l analysis was to discover a netw ork o f c lea r ho rizons of 
understanding that are implicit in our language« (Ackermann 1988, 9).
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significance o f a rt and  o th e r aesthetic p h en o m en a  can n o t be app rec ia ted  
from  som e externalised  in terpretative distance.
Experience or Reaction ?
T his k ind  o f view (as W ittgenstein in d eed  h im self points o u t in a dif­
fe ren t context) begins to sound  like pragm atism 4, an d  this way o f p u ttin g  
th e  W ittgenstein ian  position  shows tha t it in d eed  has m any affinities with 
S husterm an’s criticism o f herm eneu tic  universalism. However, an  im p o rtan t 
d ifference betw een this view an d  such a pragm atism  is tha t W ittgenstein is 
very careful o f  n o t resorting  to talk abou t »experience« in this context. A nd 
this is n o t m erely a verbal quibble o r a m atte r o f choosing d ifferen t words 
to describe the sam e ph en o m en o n .
T h e m ain differences betw een S h u ste rm an ’s and  Dewey’s appeal to 
experience  and  the W ittgensteinian appeal to reactions becom e clear if we 
look closer at the jo b  these notions are supposed  to do  in th e ir a rgum ent. 
As we m en tio n ed  before, Shusterm an quite convincingly brings o u t som e 
serious philosophical problem s in Dewey’s appeal to experience. However, 
w hen we look closer a t S huste rm an’s own use o f this term , we find th a t he  
in  fact repeats Dewey’s mistakes. This is clearly to be seen in a thought-ex- 
p e rim e n t th a t S husterm an in troduces in his p ap e r »The E nd o f A esthetic 
Experience«. H ere  Shusterm an wants us to im agine a science-fiction situa­
tion, w here we are con fro n ted  with »two visually identical a r t viewers who 
o ffer identical in te rp re ta tio n s o f the very pow erful pain tings an d  poem s 
before them «. O ne o f these art viewers is a h u m an  being, while the o th e r  is 
a »cyborg«,5 and  the only difference betw een these two is tha t the »cyborg« 
lacks the h u m an  capacity to feel (Shusterm an 1997a, 37). This m eans th a t 
»even if  the  cyborg’s in terp re ta tive  p ropositions w ere descriptively m ore  
accurate  than  the h um an  b e in g ’s, we w ould still say tha t the h u m a n ’s gen ­
eral response to a rt was superio r and  that the cyborg, since he feels abso­
lutely no th ing , does n o t really grasp w hat a r t is all about« (ibid., 38).
Now, S huste rm an’s science fiction story is ra th e r feeble, b u t I th in k  he 
is after an  im p o rtan t p o in t w hen em phasizing tha t works o f a rt m ake de­
4 W ittgenstein 1969, § 422. He does, however, add the following remark: »here I am 
being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung«.
5 Shusterm an in fact messes up the science-fiction term inology here. W hat he wants to 
talk about is not a cyborg, which is a cybernetic organism  (in this case a hum an 
whose norm al biological capability is enhanced by cybernetic devices), but ra th e r an 
android, a robot which can be thought o f as a »visually indiscernible« replica o f a 
hum an being.
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m ands o u r capacities for feeling, u n d ers tan d in g  and  response an d  tha t we 
m ust subm it to these dem ands in o rd e r to appreciate art. T h e  p rob lem  is 
tha t his p reoccupation  with »experience« leads him  astray. In  S huste rm an’s 
fable the only difference betw een these »indiscernible« a r t viewers is the 
capacity to feel, bu t it is precisely this capacity that makes the h u m an  b e in g ’s 
response to a r t »superior« to tha t o f  the »cyborg’s«. However, this capacity 
is described only in term s o f a qualitative d ifference o f experience , which is 
fu rth e r u n d ersto o d  as som e sort o f  introspectively available private occur­
rence.
Indeed , S hu ste rm an ’s a ttem p t to elaborate  the idea o f »aesthetic ex­
perience« by using this story shows th a t he inherits all the philosophical prob­
lems that Dewey struggled with: an  experience, for Shusterm an, is som e kind 
o f ineffable and  private sensation th a t m ust be characterised  in purely  p h e­
nom enological term s (he talks abou t »feeling or savoring a r t’s qualia » [ibid., 
37]).
S huste rm an’s m ain problem  is that
1 ) he thinks that the appreciation  o f a work o r an ob ject consists in the 
ob ject’s inducing  o r causing in us a certain  experience,
2) an d  th en  conceives o f this experience in abstraction  from  the work 
o r object tha t gives rise to it.
T he resu lt is tha t the value o f a work o r object is conceived o f as resid­
ing in  its effects, an d  these effects are  th o u g h t to have a n a tu re  in d ep en d e n t 
o f  the object th a t causes them .“ T hus S husterm an thinks th a t w hat is valu­
able ab o u t the aesthetic experience is precisely its im m ediate p h en o m en o ­
logical and  som atic characteristics, the »heightened  awareness« , the »ex­
perience o f  qualia«, and  so on.
But this way o f rep resen ting  artistic o r aesthetic value is certain ly  mis­
taken. T h ere  is n o th in g  w rong in saying th a t the only way o f app recia ting  a 
work o f  art is to experience it with understand ing , bu t this does not m ean  
som eth ing  like »experiencing the qualia« o f the work. Instead, w hat is im ­
p o rtan t is th a t we react to the object in  a way tha t shows th a t we understand . 
In  fact, W ittgenstein ’s criticism o f the idea o f »private« languages an d  ob­
jects  can be directly app lied  to S h u ste rm an ’s appeal to »aesthetic experi­
ence«. If W ittgenstein is correct, as I th ink  he  is, we should  n o t expect p h e­
nom enological studies o f experiences, which are g ro u n d ed  on the first-per- 
son case, to be helpful here; instead we m ust ask abou t the  publicly observ­
able criteria  fo r the application o f term s such as »experience«. M oreover, 
these criteria  can n o t be found  by an introspective investigation o f  o u r own
6 This means that Shusterm an is repeating a mistake that is characteristic o f classical 
expression theories of art (cf. Budd 1992, 445).
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p h en o m en a l experience; instead, we n eed  a concep tual inquiry  th a t issues 
in gram m atical rem arks. W ittgenstein’s appeal to reactions m ust be u n d e r­
stood as such a gram m atical rem ark, also in the con tex t o f aesthetics.
A reaction is som ething that befalls us and  has certain  phenom enal and  
som atic qualities; and  in this respect it could be described as an  experience. 
However, w hen W ittgenstein talks abou t aesthetic reactions, he  makes a very 
im p o rtan t additional point: he says tha t such reactions are n o t m erely ex­
periences o r feelings, b u t tha t they are d irected  towards an  object (i.e., they 
take on an in ten tional object). This m eans that the reaction, even if it is an  
im m ediate experience, can noč be considered  in abstraction o f its object. It 
is n o t m erely a private sensation o r experience o f qualia, b u t m anifested  by 
w hat we are p rep a red  to say o r  do  ab o u t the object. C onsequently, w hat 
m akes a reaction  an  aesthetic reaction  is its con tex t and  its d irectedness to­
w ard an  object o f a peculiar k ind, not, as S husterm an suggests, the p h en o m ­
enal characteristics o f the experience itself.
If  we co n cen tra te  on  experiences, we risk en d in g  u p  talking ab o u t the 
effects o f objects on  subjects. In contrast, the no tion  o f aesthetic reactions 
m akes it possible to take no te  bo th  o f the »phenom enological« and  the »se­
m antic« (or the »somatic« an d  »intellectual«) sides o f o u r re la tion  to works 
o f a r t an d  o th e r objects o f  aesthetic interest. T hus we could  conclude by 
saying th a t W ittgenstein has bo th  a therapeu tic  an d  an  descriptive en d  in 
m in d  w hen rem in d in g  us o f the  im portance  o f  o u r reactions, since this 
n o tio n  (if rightly and  fully e laborated) m akes it possible to describe the 
im p o rtan t role o f the aesthetic in o u r lives w ithout re lapsing e ith er in to  the 
in te llec tu a lism  o f h e rm e n eu tic  universalism  o r the  fo u n d a tio n a lism  o f 
som aesthetics.
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